



The Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System

"Blade Runner's" Post-Individual Worldspace

Author(s): Kevin R. McNamara

Source: *Contemporary Literature*, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Autumn, 1997), pp. 422-446

Published by: [University of Wisconsin Press](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1208974>

Accessed: 20/12/2014 18:15

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.



University of Wisconsin Press and The Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Contemporary Literature*.

<http://www.jstor.org>

KEVIN R. MCNAMARA

Blade Runner's Post-Individual Worldspace

Set in a postnuclear world that is being reassembled elsewhere in the solar system as the double of its predetonation self, Philip K. Dick's novel *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?* (1968) registers its protest against the dehumanizing effects of bureaucracies and technology as it follows bounty-hunter Rick Deckard on what begins as a search for six renegade androids and becomes a quest for an uncontested essence of human being that separates "us" from the ever more human-seeming androids. Ridley Scott's 1982 film *Blade Runner* (which gave its name to the reissued novel) preserves the essentials of Dick's world. In both versions of the story, the negation and recuperation of a specific human difference is represented as fundamental to the rhythm of capital; the production of ever more sophisticated androids and detection devices to catch them constitutes the major form of research and development in both economies. Likewise, each version condemns the social and economic relations it depicts. The line between the human and its simulations, however, describes a different figure in the film than in the novel, as we shall see. My particular concern is how the dissolution of markers of the human informs the attempt to imagine an alternative to the forms of domination and dehumanization each telling of the story portrays.

Androids takes place in a gray, crumbling San Francisco whose nearly deserted apartment complexes typify the logic of fifties and early sixties urban renewal. Their programmatic neutrality embodies the universalist intent of rational planning and also those planners' impoverished conception of the actual lives these struc-

tures would house. In the context of the novel, they offer a metaphor for the administration of the private lives of a population whose affects are programmed by devices like Penfield mood organs, which feature “[t]he desire to watch TV, no matter what’s on it” and even the desire to select an affect (4). As it moves toward a conclusion in which the hero and his wife free themselves from dependency on artificially induced desires and emotions, *Androids*, like so much of American cultural criticism, offers as its solution to the crises of modernity the possibility of disalienation and the restoration of a natural basis for individual life and social order.

Instead of reinforcing the border between humans and replicants, *Blade Runner* projects a world in which technologies of image and memory production render human experience and memory ultimately indistinguishable from the experience of, and the memories created for, the replicants. The novel’s late modern cityscape gives way to a built landscape that exhibits most of the features Fredric Jameson was soon to associate with the cognitive, social, and architectural space of postmodernism. From the opening scenes tracking Deckard through an internationalized bazaar that juxtaposes the high tech and the primitive, while blimps that resemble prehistoric sea life float in smoky air amid office towers whose walls are alive with images, we are in a world in which the body cannot locate itself in space, or consciousness in history, a society defined by an abandoned public sphere and an expanding rift between rich and poor, a built environment choked with waste and squalor.

Although visually compelling, this representation of Los Angeles is often perceived as devoid of criticism. Anticipating Jameson’s description of postmodernist pastiche as the combination of the “styles of the past,” emptied of their significance, in “overstimulating ensembles” (19), Pauline Kael dismisses Scott’s vision as an agglomeration of scenes that “have six subtexts but no text, and no context, either” (82). Jameson writes that the film has “little to do with futures fantasized or not”; rather, pyramids that suggest the “Mayan” skyscraper aesthetic of the thirties (echoed on the interior walls of Deckard’s apartment) and a strip club that suggests some filmic Istanbul or the Yoshiwara district of Fritz Lang’s *Metropolis* have “everything to do with late capitalism and some of its favor-

ite marketplaces" (384). Building on Jameson's work, David Harvey describes postmodernity as a condition in which it is no longer possible "to 'unify the past, present and future of our own biographical experience or psychic life' " (53). The loss of "all sense of historical continuity and memory" is said as well to deprive us of the capacity to think "about the production of a future significantly better than time present and time past" (54, 53). *Blade Runner* becomes for Harvey a parable of the postmodern condition; its most "depressing" part is the conclusion, in which "the difference between the replicant and the human becomes so unrecognizable that they can indeed fall in love" (313).

Of course, such critiques as Harvey's or Jameson's or Terry Eagleton's require their own forgetting of history, founded as they are on Georg Lukács's (mis)reading of the modernist novel as a form in which "the hero is strictly confined within the limits of his own experience. There is not for him—and apparently not for his creator—any pre-existent reality beyond his own self, acting upon him or being acted upon by him" (21). Modernist planners, it must be recalled, paid scant attention to the historical texture of urban space; rational, efficient forms would define their utopian cityscapes. Regardless, these critics now embrace modernism—despite what Jürgen Habermas calls its "deformed realization of reason in history" (qtd. in Harvey 52)—as a movement driven by a heroic, utopian program that postmodernism fails to offer.

Blade Runner certainly forgoes nostalgia for the disalienated self who is the hero of modernist utopianism. Omitting the novel's affect-producing apparatuses, the film shows us that we are immersed in a field of representation and simulation, always filtering images and narratives that fill the void of self. Likewise, it offers no unified (or "totalized") view of history, and it offers no utopian vision of its own—wisely, because there is no articulation of utopia that is not also a blueprint for domination (Marin).¹ Yet the film is

1. The title essay of Jameson's book-length analysis of postmodernism as the cultural logic of late capitalism first appeared in 1984. Responding later to the equating of totalization with totalitarianism (or, at least, unification "with an eye to power and control" [Hutcheon xi]), Jameson, unlike Harvey, has argued that the term names not "some privileged bird's-eye view of the whole . . . , which is also the Truth" (332), but the work of "securing the fragile control or survival of an even more fragile subject within a world

not therefore mired in “relativism and defeatism,” as Harvey (52) would have it. The reproduction of present contradictions and crises of the self and society, “until the whole complex gives way at the roots,” that is the film’s “peculiar utopian strategy” (Fisher 198) works in a most postmodern way by forcing Deckard, and through him the audience, to redescribe their experience and their relationships to the cultural “metanarratives” that sanction certain subject positions as privileged. As it “installs and then subverts traditional concepts of subjectivity,” a gesture that for Linda Hutcheon defines postmodern aesthetics (118), *Blade Runner* invites viewers to imagine coalitions capable of challenging the domination and exclusions that the novel criticizes but fails to move beyond.

How far beyond *mis en scène* the film’s exploration of postmodernity extends has never been fully appreciated. The urban landscape Scott created, with which my analysis begins, is not merely a scenic compilation of empty allusions; careful reading reveals it to be the product of a specific history of capitalist development. One often overlooked scene allegorizes the sort of reading the film’s city demands. In it, Deckard subjects one of the replicant’s snapshots to computer analysis by an “Esper machine” (perhaps from *espérer*, “to hope”—for the return of the referent?). As Giuliana Bruno observes, in *Blade Runner*, photography is given “the grand task of reasserting the referent, of reappropriating the Real” (74), even as it replaces the Real: if snapshots have their usual function of recording time past, for replicants this function has a greater urgency; many of the photographs record events that exist only in the memory implants Tyrell’s genetic designers introduced to control the emotional capacities that replicants spontaneously develop. When Deckard analyzes Leon’s snapshot, he enlarges sections of the print that should bear no information because they must be smaller than the grain of the film. Yet the photograph even becomes a three-

otherwise utterly independent and subject to no one’s whims or desires” (333). It is even an activity of “ ‘partial summing up’ ” (332). We must note nonetheless that if Jameson thus declines to offer “a Hegelian ‘essential cross section’ of the present” (xx), in the next breath he confirms that “the various levels [of social, economic, and cultural production] . . . yet conspire to produce a totality” (xx) that is also the Truth.

dimensional space as the analyzer tracks and pans through it to discover information not available from the camera's point of view. As the analyzer's lens navigates through photographic space, it discovers Zhora, another replicant, who had been obscured by an object in the foreground. A now three-dimensional record of a single moment in time, the photograph also unfolds a significant past that Deckard can use in plotting his pursuit of the replicants.

Taking the problematizing of spatiality and history one step further, the space within Leon's snapshot exists not simply within the photograph, but within a mirror within the photograph; the scene Deckard interrogates is an image of an image brought to three dimensions. Moreover, this record of the actual past of an artificial person is itself a *collective* memory: its composition deliberately quotes the style of Flemish-school painting (Deutelbaum 68–71). The stylistic allusion is not as gratuitous as postmodernism's critics might contend. If the paintings quoted by the photograph are human-produced records of the origins of bourgeois domesticity, that photograph is a mechanically produced image of artificial beings' domestic lives. It serves as an index of the transition from the Real to the simulacrum—not only for the replicants, but for humans as well.

Deckard also collects photographs. At least several of them record life in times before his own, but their display on his piano implies that they are to be regarded as germane to his sense of his own past. In this way, photography becomes a figure for the desire for history. The point is made through another photograph, which shows Rachael with "her" mother. Deckard reveals it as a fraud, but when he examines it later, as his attraction to Rachael grows, we see movement by a shadow that can exist only *within* the picture. The moment that snapshot records may be spurious; nevertheless, it *contains* a "living" memory that both Rachael and Deckard want her to have. If the scenes that matter exist only in photographs, and if the photograph Deckard analyzes does not reveal its sought-for subject directly but only through reflection, the photographs and the process of reading them remind us that history is never total and objective; it is constructed from a perspective that illuminates some things and conceals others. These scenes also remind us that our knowledge of the past is always mediated

through representations (even our memories are mediated), and that we must interrogate them to reveal the ideology that subtends the apparently natural.

The Los Angeles of towers and street-level decay demands such a reading if we are to recognize the history of its built landscape. It also reveals the significance of particular locations used in the film. This cityscape's look originates in the failure of this century's progressive urbanism, whose "dominant theme [was] that of a future into which the entire present is projected, of a 'rational' dominion of the future, of the elimination of the *risk* it brings with it" (Tafari 52). Its density is produced by a twofold process. First, "the selective abandonment of the inner urban core" of the nation's largest cities from the sixties onward left behind less competitive industries, the government and finance sectors, and an "irregular workforce composed primarily of minorities and the poorest segments of the metropolitan population" (Soja 181). The second phase of this urban transformation was initiated in 1957 by repeal of the city's earthquake height limitations; it accelerated in the seventies and eighties, when the city's Community Redevelopment Agency sold land at deep discounts to corporate developers whose projects were funded by the influx of offshore capital that inflated the speculative bubble of Reaganomics (Davis, "*Chinatown*" 71–72). In the ten years after 1976, forty buildings topping the old thirteen-story limit were constructed in downtown alone (Davis, "*Chinatown*" 71), and by the mid-eighties at least 75 percent of the office towers and multiblock developments in that area were foreign-owned (Davis, "*Urban Renaissance*" 109; Soja puts the figure at "as much as 90 percent" of construction financing [215]). Los Angeles became the American center of Pacific Rim finance, the American headquarters of Asian banks, and home to several large American banks and S & Ls that remain afloat, as well as sixty major corporate headquarters and their attendant law and accounting firms (Soja 192, 213). The city's half-century ties to the defense industry made it home to the nation's, if not the world's, largest pool of scientific and technical jobs (Soja 204, 224).

Concurrently with the expansion of the finance, insurance, and real estate sector, the security of blue-collar workers was rapidly undermined by deindustrialization and the recruitment of undocu-

mented, low-wage workers whose labor supported the local economic boom. In the four years before the release of *Blade Runner*, 75,000 manufacturing jobs in the region were lost to plant shut-downs and indefinite layoffs, while ten of the twelve largest non-defense-related employers entirely ceased their manufacturing operations in southern California (Soja 201–3). Remaining employers took advantage of the competition for jobs, the region's conservatism, and its pool of undocumented workers—an estimated 100,000 of whom are concentrated in downtown Los Angeles, many in garment industry sweatshops—to weaken unions and to drive wages still lower (Davis, "Urban Renaissance" 110). In the seventies, the local wage for unskilled manufacturing workers declined, precipitously in some cases, from 2 percent above the national average to 12 percent below it (Davis, "Chinatown" 76). For the poorest, there was no safety net; rather, as HUD agreements expired, subsidized apartments were renovated for resale at market rates, while social services steadily declined in the wake of the state's mid-seventies "taxpayer revolt," an upward redistribution of wealth that provided the blueprint for Reagan-Bush domestic policy. By the middle of the eighties, an estimated 250,000 people lived in illegally converted garages, while others subsisted in residency hotels, slept in shifts, or lived on the street (Soja 193).

The result of these transformations is more evident in the film than it is yet in the city, which has trended toward greater class and race segregation. If anyone hadn't noticed the deepening divisions through the eighties, the videotaped beating of Rodney King, the acquittal of the four police officers by a suburban jury, and its aftermath, including the riot and the overcharging of the defendants in the Reginald Denny case by the district attorney's office, made the deepening divide undeniable. The film intensifies the forces that have made Los Angeles "the capital of the third world" (Rieff), not simply by the emigration of approximately two million people from third world nations through the seventies and eighties (Soja 215), but more importantly because of the region's increasingly neocolonial relations: the disparity in wealth between a white elite and a predominantly darker-skinned labor force, and the division of remaining production between multinational corporations and their poorly remunerated subcontractors; in the film,

they are the Tyrell Corporation and the Asian technicians of Eye World, who do genetic engineering in market stalls (see Kerman, "Technology"; Harvey 309–13).² In 2019, a mixed-race street-level population communicates in "cityspeak, a mish-mash of Japanese, Spanish, German, what have you," that plays strikingly against the huge talking screens on blimps and buildings that advertise the promise of "a new life . . . in off-world colonies" that these people are barred by class and complexion from enjoying. This city's better-off residents live in high security apartment towers, as the urban elite increasingly does in today's cities. Their automobiles are retrofitted as hovercars to avoid contact with the groundlings, who inhabit an overcrowded, deteriorating urban core whose buildings and equipment, grown bulky from the stop-gap "retrofits" affixed to their shells, embody the intersection of the imperative of perpetual modernity with a political abdication of the public sphere that has rendered all forms of infrastructural spending dispensable.

We can further restore historic depth to the film's landscape by turning to some of the sites selected by Scott and his location scouts and by remarking the distance between their function in the film and their original programs. Two spaces are particularly significant: Deckard's apartment, which is actually Frank Lloyd Wright's house for Charles Ennis, and J. F. Sebastian's apartment building, the scene of Deckard's final showdown with replicant leader Roy Batty, which is really George H. Wyman's Bradbury Building. The Ennis House (1924) sits on a ridge above the city, an appropriate setting for a design by a strident champion of "extreme individualism" and bitter opponent of urbanism and machine culture. Wright's Broadacre City design had been motivated by his conviction that "a planned physical structure of decentralization must be the basis of all other reforms" (Fishman 132). In the film, however, the Ennis House is metamorphosed into a ninety-seventh-floor apartment occupied not by an individualist but by a servant of the amorphous power-that-is. The "Mayan" design, rather than being the architect's signature, now blends with the pyramid-style skyscrapers to

2. Syd Mead, the industrial designer who was the film's "visual futurist," described the look he sought to create as "sort of an exotic, technological interpretation of a Third World kind of country" (qtd. in Deutelbaum 66).

suggest that the city is a collective memory of the thirties turn-of-the-millennium city.

Wyman's 1893 office building design for Louis Bradbury was inspired by a Boston department store of the year 2000, as it had been described five years earlier in Edward Bellamy's *Looking Backward*: "a vast hall full of light, received not alone from the windows on all sides, but from the dome, the point of which was a hundred feet above. . . . The walls and ceiling were frescoed in mellow tints, calculated to soften without absorbing the light which flooded the interior" (Bellamy 80; see McCoy 21). In *Blade Runner*, Bellamy's brilliant utopia becomes a nocturnal Los Angeles shrouded by an almost perpetual acid rain. In Scott's dystopian version of Wyman's rendering of Bellamy's utopian department store, where once "Legends on the walls all about the hall indicated to what classes of commodities the counters below were devoted" (Bellamy 80), the commodities Deckard hunts for are members of a labor force that appear human but are regarded as Other, a trope that intensifies the social and economic relations against which Bellamy wrote—as do all aspects of Los Angeles, 2019.

Scott's failure to articulate Deckard's relation to whatever political structures maintain order in this otherwise so completely realized city has been remarked as a major flaw by Yves Chevrier, a perceptive commentator on *Blade Runner's mis en scène*. He suggests that "we can . . . reproach this voyeuristic film, which shows all, for not having shown us anything of politics" (56). Rightly finding it ridiculous that Deckard or his superior, Captain Bryant, would be acting on his own, Chevrier asks for a "psychological *veduta*" that would open onto the political power structure above Captain Bryant and show "how the political order which we are led to surmise in and around society is integrated *within* . . . [Deckard's] ego" (56–57). While one might interpret the absent *veduta* as a symptom of postmodern schizophrenia, I see the omission of politics from the film's world as indicative of the postmodernization of power. In *Blade Runner's* Los Angeles, there exists no identifiable source or center of power—not even in the archcapitalist biotechnician Eldon Tyrell. Killing Eldon Rosen, Tyrell's counterpart in the novel, would have been unthinkable; in Dick's still-modernist vision of dystopia, Rosen is the source and center from which power emanates. Scott

strategically effaces such identifiable human agency. Tyrell's murder by Roy Batty evinces no perturbations in the circuits of power, because power circulates through sophisticated management systems that are so internationalized, so technical that they are beyond the control of any one person or cartel. What the film suggests as the outcome of programmatic deregulation, privatization, and the dismantling of the welfare state is a possibility that Ron Silliman suggests Marx and his students seem "not to have foreseen": "in some utterly critical sense, the state might wither *prior to the abolition of capital,*" in that "its scope no longer defines the outer limit of power" (31).³ *Blade Runner* displays just this foresight in a landscape whose only signs of power read TDK, COCA-COLA, RCA, PAN AM, ATARI.

Deckard is shown at the beginning of the film to be caught in a form of political behavior more recognizable today than it was fifteen years ago—the politics of resentment practiced by millions of Americans who are profoundly alienated from political institutions, which they regard as a ruse of power, not a source of power and site of its negotiation. Deckard understands that his continued enjoyment of the privileges of whiteness (his ninety-seventh-floor apartment and its furnishings) depends on his continuing to do his job; his particular job is lethally to police the boundaries of difference. Otherwise he is "little people," as Captain Bryant warns. His job would fall to a nonwhite subordinate, Gaff, and his social privilege would be revoked. Rather than displacing his anger upward to entities that are not human, or even clearly identifiable, Deckard is invited to direct it against those he is in danger of becoming no different from, as do the many people (not only Americans, not only whites) encouraged to regard immigrant "others" as the cause of falling wages and living standards. Much as in the contemporary United States, where the demonization of nonwhite peoples refocuses anger that ought to be directed against the dismantling of civil liberties, the de-unionization of the labor force, de-industrialization, the transfer of production to low-wage economic dependencies abroad, the upward redistribution of wealth, and the undoing

3. We learned from the stock markets' free fall in October 1987 that trading runs by computer programs. Given the fact of the global economy, the now customary United States election year cries for economic nationalism are less a platform than a eulogy for politics.

of the welfare state, the demonization of androids deflects mass attention from the real threat to freedom posed by an economy that thrives on the manufacture of products that threaten society in ways that justify the creation of a repressive apparatus.

Racism indeed defines social hierarchies in both *Androids* and *Blade Runner*, two stories that centrally concern the relation between biology and rights. Throughout the novel and the film, and “as in racist societies generally,” Thomas Byers observes, “a great deal of emphasis is put on the making of ever finer distinctions” between dominant and subordinate groups. This work is required by “the increasing difficulty of sustaining any clear or justifiable distinction between master and slave” (“Commodity Futures” 329). The difference between the film and the novel in this regard rests on how Deckard reconceives his relationship to replicants. Scott’s Deckard increasingly identifies himself with the replicants as another victim of social and economic exploitation and as someone who experiences feelings he is not supposed to have. While Dick’s Deckard also undergoes his moments of doubt, he overcomes them in a manner that, as we shall see, relegitimizes the order he has served and that serves him.

The dehumanizing power of racism was in fact a key factor in the novel’s genesis. Dick recalled that when he began *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?* he had been reading the unpublished records of Gestapo officers in the library at Berkeley (Sammon 23).⁴ Indeed, the novel opens with a powerful, ironic condemnation of the American legacy of racism: a television commercial offers androids free of charge, “Either as body servants or tireless field hands,” to all home buyers in one developer’s off-world suburb, which “duplicates the halcyon days of the pre-Civil War Southern states!” (14). A form of Euro-colonialist wish fulfillment, the image of artificial people building artificial worlds makes true the lie of the age of colonization: these new lands *are* uninhabited wilds; the sub-

4. Darko Suvin has assessed *Androids* as a failure because of “its underlying confusion between androids as wronged lower class and as inhuman menace” (20). I believe that it makes more sense to interpret the androids’ position in terms of race rather than class because of the emphasis on biological determinations of identity; while often shrill and offensive, derisive characterizations of the working class did not question its humanity with the regularity or the fervor that marked racial discourse.

ject “peoples” *are* not quite human, and they *are* better suited for physical labor. Yet like Thomas Jefferson’s *Notes on the State of Virginia*, which discusses slavery’s effects on manners among white masters without questioning blacks’ “natural” inferiority (138–40), the novel never really disputes the difference in nature between human and android on which Deckard’s return to his “self” depends. Instead, it holds out the hope that we can unplug from the mediated mass-world and, “by listening to our dreams, become fully human” (Mackey 92).

The bio-logic of scientific racism was outlined as early as 1892 by Joseph Le Conte, president of the American Society for the Advancement of Science, professor of natural history at the University of California, and a one-time slave owner. Le Conte proposed that the “intellectual and moral capital” of each “race” is passed on as part of its genetic inheritance (366). Through the device of a graph allegedly representing the narrow limits within which race mixing might be genetically safe (370), Le Conte sought to vindicate “race-prejudice or race-repulsion” as “an instinct necessary to preserve the blood purity of the higher race” (365). Blood purity is equally crucial to identifying the masters in *Androids*. Blood tests measure genetic damage and separate “regular” men and women from the “specials” who, as a result of fallout-induced disease, cannot “reproduce within the tolerances [of genetic normalcy] set by law” (6). An android, if shot, may “burst and parts of it [fly]” (195), or its “brain box. . . . bl[o]w into pieces” (82), but it will not bleed—as Scott’s replicants will. Blood is also the objective correlative of the empathy excited by the state religion, Mercerism, which is practiced as one caresses the handles of an empathy box while projectively identifying with the filmic image of old Wilbur Mercer, who moves on an endless, uncertain quest (17–18). By some unexplained transference, cuts Mercer suffers when struck by rocks are manifest on the bodies of communicants (19, 156); the flow of blood cites both the crucifixion and Shylock’s protest of his own humanity.

Between the excluded androids and specials, no alliance seems possible. The novel’s “special,” J. R. Isidore, may console the renegade androids, “they don’t treat me very well either, like for instance I can’t emigrate. . . . You can’t come here; I can’t [leave]” (143), but under the rule of human privilege, “specials” and an-

droids each define themselves as more human than the other. Each group is left to a destiny that recapitulates the fate Le Conte claimed to await "inferior races" that come into contact with whites. According to "the economy of Nature" (359), he theorized, "If [a race] be . . . plastic, docile, imitative, some form of subordination will be the result; if, on the other hand, it be highly specialized and rigid, extermination is unavoidable" (360–61). Isidore is plastic and docile; he survives on the margin of a society that neither values him nor permits him to leave. Rigid because designed for specific functions, androids are sentenced to extermination—not by nature but *in the name of nature*.

Several critics have argued that in the novel Deckard ends his complicity with the bio-logic of oppression when he encounters Luba Luft, an android whose "interest in expressionist art, specifically in Munch's *Puberty*" (Fischer 105) places her in the "class" of "Humane Androids" (Robinson 92). Patricia Warrick suggests that Luba "mirrors to [Deckard] the feminine, creative part of his nature which he has so totally suppressed" (126).⁵ There is support for Warrick's assertion in Dick's own explanation that "the theme of the book is that Deckard is dehumanized by tracking down androids" (qtd. in Sammon 27), but "totally suppressed" is perhaps too strong; it forgets that Deckard has an extensive collection of opera records and that he lectures Phil Resch on art history (79, 122). To redeem Deckard by humanizing Luba, these critics must ignore the pointed irony that she is a diva, a woman who performs emotions she need not feel in languages she need not understand. Luba confesses, "my life has consisted of imitating the human, . . . acting as if I had the thoughts and impulses a human would have" (117). Other androids supply their own testimony: Irmgard Baty (spelled thus in the novel) remarks bitterly on "that empathy that humans have"

5. Critics who accept this line of interpretation may regard the android as a metaphor for "[t]he schizoid individual [who]. . . denies his emotions and operates as an intelligent, logical machine" (Warrick 122); a relation between them is proposed in the novel. But such a reading only makes Deckard's success against the androids more repugnant unless one also finds Deckard's perception of the android changed at the novel's end (a doubtful claim that I shall return to).

(185) and androids lack; Roy Baty claims that Sebastian would turn in the others for the bounty if he were an android (144); Rachael describes androids as “Chitinous reflex-machines” (169). Dick himself described them as “cruel, cold, and heartless. They have no empathy . . . and don’t care what happens to other creatures. They are essentially *less than human*” (qtd. in Sammon 27). While Peter Fitting concedes that reasons exist for “Deckard’s—and the reader’s—hesitations and growing sympathy for the androids,” he lists “a number of incidents, including their torture of the spider, their attempts to undermine Mercerism, and their inability to participate in that empathic experience, . . . [that] all make clear in the novel that the androids are meant to be understood as evil and inhuman” (342), and that Deckard’s own humanity is measured by his psychic distance from them.⁶

Warrick’s claim does raise barely suppressed questions of gender in the novel, however. “Racial” conflict is a contest of masculinities in *Androids*, as it is in Le Conte’s world; late-nineteenth-century dic-

6. The novel’s seeming reversals have been discussed by critics. For slightly different reasons Kim Stanley Robinson and Patricia Warrick insist that contradiction is central to the novel’s point: “the critical debate over the status of the androids in this novel is an indication of Dick’s success, for he clearly means to give us contradictory information regarding them” (Robinson 92); “the reader is spiraled through so many assertions and negations and negations of negations that at the end of the novel he is uncertain of what Dick would have him believe. Dick consistently refuses to provide straightforward answers because language limits” (Warrick 129–30). Robinson begs the question of the novel’s meaning, while Warrick celebrates its lack of meaning as somehow more meaningful. Both critics dispute Dick’s own characterization of the androids: Irmgard Baty is “the warm, responsive female” (Warrick 124) in a novel that severs the link between “android” and “inhuman” (Robinson 92).

John Huntington dismisses these contradictions as a trick Dick learned from A. E. van Vogt, who “advised young writers that in order to keep their readers’ interest they should introduce a new idea every 800 words”; doing so becomes “a way of generating complexity and of enforcing at least the illusion of a relentless dialectic” (153, 154). Huntington concludes, “By moving without mediation from one moral perspective to the other, [he] gives the *feeling* of moral three-dimensionality, of depth” (154), without the reality.

Ridley Scott has his own infatuation with false complexity, particularly as he plants hints that Deckard is a replicant. They have produced debate among fans as to whether Deckard is—or should be—a replicant (see Hirai). Scott had wanted him to be one (Chapman), and the director’s cut suggests that he is, but if he is, we have another rather uninteresting do-I-wake-or-do-I-sleep puzzle rather than a window into postmodernity. For a list of endings that were considered and discarded, see Kolb 139–43.

tionaries defined *mulatto* as the “offspring of a negress by a white man” (Brewer 839), acknowledging by their omission the unspeakable anxiety engendered by the thought of relations between black men and white women. The sterile android’s threat to women is never established, but it need not be; the danger of rape is a projection that institutes the sexual desire of dominant males as normative and authorizes male violence as a way of maintaining possession of women.⁷ What we do see throughout the novel is that the one object of collective veneration bigger than Mercer is the phallus: Deckard is cocooned in one, his “speedy beefed-up hovercar” (74, 77). Others dangle from his belt—pistols, laser tubes, and especially the Ajax model Lead Codpiece that he wears to protect his masculinity and also his humanity, which would be compromised if he were no longer capable of “reproduc[ing] within the tolerances set by law” (6). The symbolic potency of the codpiece is remarked early by a willful Iran, Deckard’s wife, who derides an advertisement for the codpiece (in an outburst of penis envy?) as “that awful commercial . . . , the one I hate” (2).

By the novel’s end, however, harmony between Rick and Iran has been restored. If she once had refused to dial a 594 on her mood organ (“pleased acknowledgment of husband’s superior wisdom” [5]), and he once had wished he had “gotten rid of her” because “nothing penetrates” her anymore (83; himself included?), at his final homecoming Iran declares herself “damn glad” that he has returned “home where [he] ought to be” (214). He retires for some “[l]ong deserved peace” without first dialing a 670 on his own Penfield (215). As Rick and Iran finally abandon the media apparatus, authentic emotion, and unmediated reality along with it, appears headed for a comeback. It seems likely that they will have sex again and maybe even have children. Most importantly, these final events occur in “real” time, as expressions of their authentic biologi-

7. This proposition finds support in what is surely Jefferson’s most offensive observation about African peoples in *Notes* (138), which equates the supposed desire of black men for white women with an alleged desire of orangutans for black women. One ought not to miss how, in this passage, Jefferson shades a “racial” difference toward a difference between species.

My thanks to Don Weeda for referring me to Brewer’s definition of *mulatto*.

cal and emotional needs. The novel thereby humanizes Deckard at the same time that it reinstalls traditional gender roles.

The film, on the other hand, does much to humanize the replicants; Peter Fitting reserves some of his harshest criticisms for the ways in which *Blade Runner* makes them sympathetic. They are no longer what bounty hunter Phil Resch calls “murderous illegal aliens” (119), using a phrase that would be shocking but not surprising in the present Californian debates over “securing” the Mexican border. They bleed. They mourn. They capture Kodak moments. Indeed, as Fitting laments, “at times the narrative of the replicants’ struggle to survive threatens to overwhelm the viewers’ sympathy with Deckard” (343). As part of the film’s strategy of forcing to a crisis the ideology that structures its society, these revisions allow us to continue to sympathize with Deckard only as he comes to recognize the lack of reasonable justification for the work he does.

At the same time that the replicants are humanized, Deckard’s experience is revealed as not authentically his own. More properly a citizen of the postmodern state, the film’s Deckard is always plugged into a collective mindspace of images from which he constructs a self, much as his Los Angeles is created from the archive of architectural styles. His self-representation through the conventions of film-noir detectivedom, a style from a past he never lived if this is 2019, is no more an individual choice than is Rachael’s *femme-noire* appearance. Each equally participates in the logic of a culture that constructs itself from images of itself—the one in which we participate every day. Indeed, in the context of quotation and displacement that defines the film’s built landscape, Deckard’s voice-over, despite or even because of the weakness of its prose, makes sense as a structural device designed to call attention to its conventionality and to suggest that Deckard isn’t authentically Deckard—although he is not a replicant either; he is enacting a cultural memory of masculinity.

Not everyone agrees, of course. Marleen Barr sees the same naturalizing of gender difference at work in the film. While she acknowledges that the film “seems to demonstrate” that women are “more than sex objects,” she contends that nevertheless “it refuses to acknowledge it” because “[t]he male filmmaker . . . [presents] elec-

tric billboards picturing animated sexually enticing female faces, [and] fails to include male replicant sex partners for the human women in the colonies" (30, 29). Similarly, "the bare breasted Zhora . . . suggests nothing more than vulnerability and sexuality" in her dressing-room scene, while Roy Batty's bare chest signifies "menacing strength" (30) when he and Deckard meet in their final showdown. It is true that *Blade Runner* employs an *iconography* of gender very similar to Dick's, and that it, too, links masculinity with violence and both of them with a repressive social order. The question that Barr's argument seems to me to beg is, How can one represent oppression without at the same time being implicated in it? As Rick Instrell (169) observes (indeed, as Barr concedes), the film opens to two readings. One of them finds the representation of women in the film symptomatic of its overall sexism. The other reading finds in the production of these images and the attention called to their conventionality and oppressiveness an implicit critique of the logic of sexism that, indeed, would preclude the production of the replicant gigolos whose absence Barr remarks.

The best evidence of the film's self-consciousness about gender is the difference between its and the novel's representations of women. Whereas the novel characterizes women almost exclusively by the shape of their breasts (58, 65, 84, 145, 160, 164), perhaps associating women with nurturing in the postnuclear future, the camera is drawn less to breasts than to the props by which women are defined: Zhora's tamed snake, the veil Pris takes to hide herself from Deckard, Rachael's forties outfits. The scenes Barr singles out seem to me to work by invoking and then frustrating expectations about gender roles; Zhora's bared breasts are quickly covered by an armored bra (a sex-changed trace of the absent codpiece?) as she throttles Deckard—she is, after all, designed as part of "an off-world kick-murder squad." Roy, meanwhile, renounces his menacing violence and delivers Deckard from his death, an act that critiques the heretofore dominant ideal of masculinity.⁸ Rather than sanction objectification—as Dick also did by me-

8. Of course, one can in turn argue that Zhora is punished for transgressing the customary boundaries of gender, while Roy's choice to give Deckard new life—coupled with Rachael's infertility—evidences a male fantasy that substitutes fathering for mothering—in this case, through a *man-made* "man." Here in particular Linda Hutcheon's description

diating Deckard's desire for Luba Luft through Mozart's Pamina and the subject of Munch's *Puberty*, figures whose status as great art/human expression sanctions his desire—the film undermines the order of gender it nonetheless presents by exposing its economic motivation. It locates Zhora in a strip joint whose oppressiveness is rendered visually in its close, overheated spaces. Pris is described as “the basic pleasure model” supplied to military officers in the off-world colonies. *Blade Runner's* representations of female sexuality thus ask to be read as simulations—models produced by economic domination and male fantasy—even as, given the demographics of the market for Hollywood thrillers and “science fantasy” art, the film profits from those representations.

Deckard's own activities of self-construction in the film (but not in the novel) disqualify him as a hero for the viewer who seeks through identification with him a representation of his own autonomy. They reveal instead that memory has become alienable and mental space colonized by various technologies of reproduction.⁹ Memory is even genetically reproducible, the replicants' experience attests. Their artificial pasts merge seamlessly with actual experience when, for instance, Rachael plays the piano. The piano lessons she “remembers” were taken by Tyrell's dead niece; regardless, the memory passes the pragmatist's test for real when it enables her to play. Likewise, if Rachael's mistrust of her memories leads her to resist Deckard's advances in the film's notorious “rape” scene, they do not fail her when she calls upon them. Meanwhile, Deckard is a self-confessed “cold fish” who possesses nothing

of postmodern art as an ironic art that installs and subverts contexts and conventions provides a way of understanding, if not of determining, the film's reading of gender. In any case, these scenes confront us with the what Alan Trachtenberg calls the “dangerous indeterminacy” of images when they are left “unanchored” by some written text (225).

9. What I have described is for Anne Friedberg the precise articulation of “cinema and the postmodern condition”: “the VCR has become a privatized museum of past moments—of different genres, times, and commodities—all reduced to uniform, interchangeable, equally accessible units. . . . The cinema spectator and the armchair equivalent—the home-video viewer, who commands fast forward, fast reverse, and many speeds of slow motion; who can easily switch between channels and tape; who is always able to repeat, replay, and return—is a spectator *lost in* but also *in control of* time” (74–76).

ing that is identifiably *him*. It may be that the film's replicants continue to fail the Voigt-Kampff empathy test, but they nevertheless manifest an equal claim to occupy the emotional Real. After all, the test does not measure feelings; it detects only physical manifestations from which emotion may be inferred—"fluctuations of tension within the eye muscles" and "capillary dilation in the facial area" that are "primary autonomic response[s] . . . [and] can't be controlled voluntarily" (41).

The activity of self-production in the film thus differs in kind from what is portrayed in the novel. Dick's Deckard has a brush with schizophrenia when Mercer appears to him unmediated by video screens or an empathy box. The televangelist of empathy has by this time been unmasked as an alcoholic bit actor named Al Jarry by android television personality Buster Friendly (182–84). Regardless, Mercer successfully guides Deckard through his pursuit of the last three fugitive androids (195). Soon after, on a peak in Oregon, Deckard faces the possibility that "Everything is true. . . . Everything anybody has ever thought" (201), but he backs away from the void as he declares, "Mercer isn't a fake. . . . Unless reality is a fake" (207). The line between the "real" and the "fake" is already tenuous in a world where an empathy box is "the most personal possession you have! . . . an extension of your body" (58) and the truth of emotional experience lies with the machinery that verifies it; nonetheless, we are asked to accept emotion as the foundation of reality. "[T]o violate [his] own identity" may be "the basic condition of life" for the alienated individual (156), yet only faith in that innate identity enables Deckard's return to himself at the novel's end.

The film's portrayal of the collapse of human and replicant consciousness into each other offers viewers a more faithful representation of postmodern psychic space than does the novel or those critics (for example, David Desser, Norman Fischer, Fitting) who wish to save some reality principle by preserving the uniqueness of "human experience." Dick's Deckard retains his faith in an underlying, authentic self that he brings to and takes away from Mercerism's global encounter groups; without this innate being he would have no identity to violate and nothing would remain when, as they do at the novel's end, he and Iran disconnect from their mood organs. But as instantaneous broadcast technology dissolves distance and

delay, allowing us to be “present” for emotional experience of the most far-flung tragedies, as nostalgia shows offer us the opportunity to “relive the past for the first time” and a host of television and radio talk shows offer endless possibilities for the publication of our private griefs and the guided recovery of our repressed pasts, the separation between what we experience and what we remember, what happens and what is edited into existence and meaning, disappears. It may all amount to a very profitable form of media-controlled consciousness, but the images and stories are actively solicited by a public anxious to prove its continued ability to produce real (that is, emotional) responses—even if these experiences and responses are less our own than experiences and responses *we want to have*, as the photograph of Rachael and her mother and the photographs on Deckard’s piano represent memories they want to have, pasts that allow them to begin imagining the future as something other than a repetition of the present.

Deckard’s path toward a transformed future begins with his ability to see replicants in terms other than their official description as inhuman killers. In his sympathetic identification with Rachael, and then as he and Roy “renounce their warrior roles” (Kellner, Leibowitz, and Ryan 7) and think beyond their programming to resituate themselves vis-à-vis each other as “Other,” we witness Deckard overcoming the repulsion at the sight of difference that Le Conte read as an expression of an “instinctual” desire for sameness and purity. This denouement may only intensify the present crises of the self and society; it leaves Deckard perched, William Fisher writes, and “hesitat[ing] between the pull of an older individualism and the push of a nascent collective life” whose members’ “perceived passivity. . . [has been] the real locus of anguish for the protagonist” (197, 196). The uncertainty of their future is rendered more dramatically in Scott’s intended conclusion, which ends at the elevator door—no voice-over, no reprieves, no flight to a still natural North; now available in *Blade Runner: The Director’s Cut*, it fared poorly at test screenings and was replaced by the escapist resolution. As we leave Deckard and Rachael on the verge of rejoining life at street level,

amid which we first saw him, we should appreciate that the scene has been prepared by a “narrative line [that] establishes a clear similarity between Deckard’s recognition of his exploitation by the Tyrell Corporation and the replicants’ rebellion,” and that invites us to imagine instead “the possibility of symbiosis between humans and machines” (Kellner, Leibowitz, and Ryan 7).¹⁰ Instead of lapsing into David Harvey’s depression, induced by the disappearance of human difference (and privilege), or sharing Douglas Kellner, Flo Leibowitz, and Michael Ryan’s dismay at the film’s “individualist ending” (7), we might consider how the irreconcilability of these two readings points to other possible interpretations.

True enough, the ideal of individualism is installed at the film’s end—particularly in its first theatrical release—but as Harvey laments, it is also subverted. Advertising may work in approximately the same way—mass-marketing individuality through such oxymoronic strategies as “factory customizing”—yet particularly in the director’s cut, *Blade Runner* reverses the trajectory of advertising. It returns the “individual” to the archive of props and images rather than fabricating and naturalizing him. Nor is the crowd so dangerous and dehumanizing in the film. Viewers should recognize what many of my students have remarked, what a reviewer for the *Architectural Record* found appealing in this city—the “active street life” (Linn 27) in which proxemics are radically altered and personal

10. The pairing of Deckard and Rachael is predicated on a scene that is, admittedly, the most troublesome in the film. Thomas Byers finds it “very much like date-rape from a male perspective” (“Kissing” 88) and suggests that by “forcing Rachel [*sic*] to be the image of woman,” Deckard “can reassert himself as imaginary man” (“Kissing” 90). If Deckard’s behavior represents “a masculine nostalgia for a unified and secure sense of self” (“Kissing” 90), and I think it does—self-consciously on the part of the film—we need to ask to what extent the enactment of that masculinity is part of the film’s penchant for installing and subverting hierarchies, binary oppositions, and conventions, which Hutcheon claims as the *modus operandi* of postmodernism.

Byers briefly entertains the possibility that violence and fear are “portrayed so graphically [in the “rape” scene] as to suggest the possibility of an ironic reading, one that would attribute to the film a self-conscious recognition and critique of the scene’s misogyny” (“Kissing” 89). Rick Instrell explores that possibility as well and is led to ask, “How can one represent oppression without at the same time being implicated in it?” (169). This is, of course, Hutcheon’s central point about postmodernist critique: it is *always* complicit. Unlike Instrell, Byers rejects the implicit critique and produces a wholly symptomatic reading of the scene.

space has become collective space, into which violence is introduced from above by the policing of difference. *Blade Runner* thus deserves to be read as a critique not only of multinational capitalism but also of regressive critiques of postmodernism that long for the certainty of some natural order or a past that is imagined to be simpler and more comprehensible. Such appeals, common in left and right utopian discourse, are too often the theoretical equivalent of the film's rightly condemned escapist ending. Whatever critical function they serve, these appeals only found alternative structures of dominance and exclusion as they attempt to resolve conflict into unity.¹¹ Absent that ending, the film leaves viewers to distinguish among the many forms of dehumanization it depicts, those that are *prima facie* oppressive (racism, sexism, economic disenfranchisement) and those that, by marking the end of one construction of human being and its supports, signal the commencement of our task to reimagine the conditions of our subjectivity in the complex, often contradictory space of postmodern culture.

Texas A & M University

WORKS CITED

- Barr, Marleen. "Metahuman 'Kipple' or, Do Male Movie Makers Dream of Electric Women?: Speciesism and Sexism in *Blade Runner*." Kerman, ed. 25–31.
- Bellamy, Edward. *Looking Backward, 2000–1887*. 1888. New York: Signet, 1960.
- Berger, Harry, Jr. "The Renaissance Imagination: Second World and Green World." *Centennial Review* 9 (1965): 36–78.
- Brewer, Ebenezer Cobham. *Brewer's Dictionary of Phrase and Fable*. 1894 ed. Philadelphia: Lippincott; London: Cassell, 1910.

11. See Marin, esp. 65–66. Concluding his reading of Thomas More's *Utopia*, Harry Berger Jr. argues for understanding the failure of any representation of utopia as an integral part of its function: "The green world seems to possess two essential qualities: first, since it is only metaphorically a place or space, it embodies a condition whose value should not remain fixed. . . . It appears first as exemplary or appealing and lures us away from the evil or confusion of everyday life. But when it has fulfilled its moral, esthetic, social, cognitive or experimental functions, it becomes inadequate and its creator turns us out. . . . the second quality of the green world is that it is ambiguous: its usefulness and dangers arise from the same source. In its positive aspects it provides a temporary haven for recreation or clarification, experiment or relief; in its negative aspects it projects the urge of the paralyzed will to give up, escape, work magic, abolish time and flux and the intrusive reality of other minds" (73–74).

- Bruno, Giuliana. "Ramble City: Postmodernism and *Blade Runner*." *October* 41 (1987): 61–74.
- Byers, Thomas B. "Commodity Futures: Corporate State and Personal Style in Three Recent Science-Fiction Movies." *Science-Fiction Studies* 14 (1987): 326–39.
- . "Kissing Becky: Masculine Fears and Misogynist Moments in Science Fiction Films." *Arizona Quarterly* 45.3 (1989): 77–95.
- Chapman, Murray. "Is Deckard a Replicant?" *Blade Runner Web Page*. World Wide Web. <http://www.uq.edu.au/~csmchapm/bladerunner/deckard.html>. 8 Dec. 1995.
- Chevrier, Yves. "*Blade Runner*; or, The Sociology of Anticipation." Trans. Will Straw. *Science-Fiction Studies* 11 (1984): 50–60.
- Davis, Mike. "*Chinatown*, Part Two? The 'Internationalization' of Downtown Los Angeles." *New Left Review* 164 (1987): 65–86.
- . "Urban Renaissance and the Spirit of Postmodernism." *New Left Review* 151 (1985): 106–13.
- Desser, David. "*Blade Runner*: Science Fiction and Transcendence." *Literature/Film Quarterly* 13 (1985): 172–79.
- Deutelbaum, Marshall. "Visual Memory/Visual Design: The Remembered Sign in *Blade Runner*." *Literature/Film Quarterly* 17 (1989): 66–72.
- Dick, Philip K. *Blade Runner* [*Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?*]. 1968. New York: Del Rey-Ballantine, 1982.
- Eagleton, Terry. "Capitalism, Modernism and Postmodernism." *New Left Review* 152 (1985): 60–73.
- Fischer, Norman. "*Blade Runner* and *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?*: An Ecological Critique of Human-Centered Value Systems." *Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory* 13.3 (1989): 102–13.
- Fisher, William. "Of Living Machines and Living-Machines: *Blade Runner* and the Terminal Genre." *New Literary History* 20 (1988): 187–98.
- Fishman, Robert. *Urban Utopias in the Twentieth Century: Ebenezer Howard, Frank Lloyd Wright, and Le Corbusier*. 1977. Cambridge, MA: MIT P, 1982.
- Fitting, Peter. "Futurecop: The Neutralization of Revolt in *Blade Runner*." *Science-Fiction Studies* 14 (1987): 340–54.
- Friedberg, Anne. "Cinema and the Postmodern Condition." *Viewing Positions: Ways of Seeing Film*. Ed. Linda Williams. Rutgers Depth of Field Ser. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers UP, 1995. 59–83.
- Harvey, David. *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change*. London: Blackwell, 1990.
- Hirai, Eiji, ed. "The *Blade Runner* File." Off World Page. World Wide Web. <http://kzsu.stanford.edu/uwi/br/br-file.html>. 8 Dec. 1995.
- Huntington, John. "Philip K. Dick: Authenticity and Insincerity." *Science-Fiction Studies* 15 (1988): 152–60.
- Hutcheon, Linda. *A Poetics of Postmodernism: History, Theory, Fiction*. London: Routledge, 1988.

- Instrell, Rick. "Blade Runner: The Economic Shaping of a Film." *Cinema and Fiction: New Modes of Adapting, 1950–1990*. Ed. John Orr and Colin Nicholson. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 1992. 160–70.
- Jameson, Fredric. *Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*. Post-Contemporary Interventions ser. Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1991.
- Jefferson, Thomas. *Notes on the State of Virginia*. 1787. Ed. William Peden. 1954. New York: Norton, 1972.
- Kael, Pauline. "Baby, the Rain Must Fall." *New Yorker* 12 July 1982: 82–85.
- Kellner, Douglas, Flo Leibowitz, and Michael Ryan. "Blade Runner: A Diagnostic Critique." *Jump Cut* 29 (1984): 6–8.
- Kerman, Judith B., ed. *Retrofitting "Blade Runner": Issues in Ridley Scott's "Blade Runner" and Philip K. Dick's "Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?"* Bowling Green, OH: Bowling Green State U Popular P, 1991.
- Kerman, Judith B. "Technology and Politics in the *Blade Runner* Dystopia." Kerman, ed. 16–24.
- Kolb, William M. "Script to Screen: *Blade Runner* in Perspective." Kerman, ed. 132–53.
- Le Conte, Joseph. "The Race Problem in the South." *Man and the State, Studies in Applied Sociology; Popular Lectures and Discussions before the Brooklyn Ethical Association*. New York: Appleton, 1892. 349–82.
- Linn, Charles. "Blade Runner Still on the Cutting Edge, Familiar as It Is." *Architectural Record* Oct. 1994: 27.
- Lukács, Georg. "The Ideology of Modernism." *The Meaning of Contemporary Realism*. Trans. John and Necke Mander. London: Merlin, 1963. 17–46.
- Mackey, Douglas A. *Philip K. Dick*. Twayne's United States Authors Ser. 533. Boston: Twayne, 1988.
- Marin, Louis. "Disneyland: A Degenerate Utopia." *Glyph* 1 (1977): 50–66.
- McCoy, Esther. "The Bradbury Building." *Arts & Architecture* Apr. 1953: 20–21, 42–43.
- Rieff, David. *Los Angeles: Capital of the Third World*. New York: Simon, 1991.
- Robinson, Kim Stanley. *The Novels of Philip K. Dick*. Studies in Speculative Fiction 9. Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Research P, 1984.
- Sammon, Paul M. "The Making of *Blade Runner*." *Cinéfantastique* July-Aug. 1982: 20–47.
- Scott, Ridley, dir. *Blade Runner*. Warner Bros.-Ladd, 1982.
- Scott, Ridley, dir. *Blade Runner: The Director's Cut*. Warner Bros.-Ladd, 1982. [First commercial release, 1992.]
- Silliman, Ron. "What Do Cyborgs Want? (Paris, Suburb of the Twentieth Century)." *Jean Baudrillard: The Disappearance of Art and Politics*. Ed. William Stearns and William Chaloupka. New York: St. Martin's, 1992. 27–38.
- Soja, Edward W. *Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory*. London: Verso, 1989.
- Suvín, Darko. "P. K. Dick's Opus: Artifice as Refuge and World View." *Science-Fiction Studies* 2 (1975): 8–22.

- Tafuri, Manfredo. *Architecture and Utopia: Design and Capitalist Development*.
Trans. Barbara Luigia La Penta. Cambridge, MA: MIT P, 1976.
- Trachtenberg, Alan. *Reading American Photographs: Images as History, Mathew
Brady to Walker Evans*. New York: Hill, 1989.
- Warrick, Patricia S. *Mind in Motion: The Fiction of Philip K. Dick*. Carbondale:
Southern Illinois UP, 1987.